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Recent trends in technological advances have resulted in the commercial sector
leading the military sector in many areas of technological development. As a result, there
are many readily available components and end items that can be designed, integrated
and assembled into military hardware that will satisfy the stringent requirements of the
tactical battlefield. Use of commercial or non-developmental items compresses the
overall acquisition time, but currently reduces time available for logistics planning and
preparation. The result is new systems being fielded without the necessary support
structure in place. Proper use of warranties, Contractor Logistics Support, and Prime
Vendor support might improve equipment readiness and ensure the gap is bridged
between a newly fielded system and a mature supply support system for optimum benefit
to the Department of Defense (DoD) and the taxpayer. Good logistics support planning
in the early phases of the acquisition process will reduce the life cycle costs and increase
operational availability. Applying these approaches to the Tactical Quiet Generator
(TQG) would seem to provide significant benefit and offer other acquisition and logistics
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The purpose of this research is to examine the provisioning, procurement,
production, maintenance concept, and distribution of spare parts required for sustaining
maintenance and support of a new system or piece of equipment throughout its life cycle.
A case study of the Tactical Quiet Generator (TQG) is used to illustrate the issues that
affect logistics support of a newly fielded piece of equipment. It then analyzes the
research data, to recommend factors that should be considered when making spare part
support determinations to ensure the gap is bridged between a newly fielded system and a
mature supply support system. Finally, it recommends areas for change in current policy
and procedures for optimum benefit to the Department of Defense (DoD), the
Government, and the taxpayer.
B. BACKGROUND
As the Tactical Quiet Generator is being utilized, there is an ongoing maintenance
and support capability that needs to be installed and in-place to ensure that the system
continues to be available when required. The Army fielded this system using the Total
Package Fielding (TPF) concept. The initial spare parts package was supposed to
maintain the system until the supply system matured to support the equipment.
Additionally, the system was covered by a limited warranty during initial fielding. This
warranty was designed to ensure the Government received a quality product. Problems
developed when the initial push package of parts were consumed and material
procurement lead times forced delays in repairing equipment. Further problems
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developed when parts needed were not part of the initial fielding package and were not
available through the supply system. This situation was further aggravated when units
were faced with a long-term deployment to Kuwait and the supply system was not ready
to support the Tactical Quiet Generator.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question:
Based on lessons learned from the Tactical Quiet Generator, what are the critical
aspects of a logistics support plan in order to bridge the gap between initial fielding and a
mature system?
2. Secondary Research Questions:
a. How did the Project Manager of Mobile Electric and Power
determine the provisioning, procurement and production of spare parts required for
sustaining maintenance and support of a new system?
b. What is the current policy towards determining the requirements
for spare parts to support a new system?
c. How can the initial push package of parts for a new system be
improved?
d. How is DLA equipped to meet surge requirements for newly
fielded equipment (i.e. major deployments)?
e. What interim support capability should be maintained to cover
material procurement lead times?
f. What can we do if total maintenance and support requirements
exceed initial expectations?
g. What are the current policies and procedures for life cycle support
after initial fielding?
h. How does the current policy affect life cycle support after initial
fielding?
i. How do the current procedures affect units that receive new
equipment?
j. What are item managers' incentives and what are they rated on?
D. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
The researcher has analyzed the provisioning, procurement, production, and
distribution of spare parts required for sustaining maintenance and support of a new
system from a logistics officer's perspective, using the Tactical Quiet Generator as a case
study. The research includes a literature review of various ways to support equipment
throughout its life cycle. This thesis will result in recommendations to affect future
policy and procedure changes.
E. METHODOLOGY
The first objective of this research paper is to provide an overview of the fielding
of the Tactical Quiet Generator through the Program Management Office (Mobile
Electric and Power-PM) as well as current means of logistical support. This will be
accomplished through a literature review of sources including, but not limited to, the
following:
• Unclassified Department of Defense publications;
• Published academic research papers;
• References, publications, and electronic media available at the Naval
Postgraduate School library;
• General Accounting Office reports and testimony before Congress;
• Internet websites and homepages (DoD, commercial, and academic).
The next objective is to study equipment readiness data on the Tactical Quiet
Generator as provided by the Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA) and the issues
involved in collecting this data. This will be followed by an analysis of the initial
fielding package of repair parts and the current fielding package. Both packages will be
compared to current demand history to see their utilization. This will be followed by a
study of the Defense Logistics Agency's procedure for stocking repair parts for newly
fielded items. Finally, personal interviews will be conducted of selected military officers
and Government civilian officials in selected DoD Service component and agencies, as
well as key defense industry officials to get opinions and recommendations on changes to
policy and procedure. Lessons learned will be extracted from the case analysis of the
TQG.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
• Chapter I. Introduction The introduction identifies the focus and purpose of
the thesis and states the primary and subsidiary research questions.
• Chapter II. Tactical Quiet Generator This section provides an overview of
the acquisition and background history of the Tactical Quiet Generator.
• Chapter HI. Operations and Maintenance of New Equipment This segment
presents an analysis of the readiness rates of a few selected models of
generators. Next, maintenance issues and trends are studied. Finally, the
initial fielding package of repair parts and the current fielding package are
studied. Both packages will be compared to current demand history from Ft.
Campbell and the Defense Logistics Agency to look at usage rates.
• Chapter IV Analysis of Alternative Means of Support This section will
analyze the pros and cons of warranties, Contractor Logistics Support, and
Prime Vendor as a means of support for life cycle support.
• Chapter V. Summary, Recommendations, and Conclusions Summarizes the
findings of the research, and answers the research questions.
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY
This study will provide some answers as to how to bridge the gap in life cycle
support between initial fielding of a system and supply system maturity thereby avoiding
a breakdown in support, and providing a methodology to handle deployment surges.
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
II. THE TACTICAL QUIET GENERATOR
A. INTRODUCTION
Electricity is something we all take for granted nowadays, but it is something that
is essential to every aspect of our lives. Little did Benjamin Franklin and other famous
scientists realize how much the modern world would depend on their discoveries. The
widespread use of electricity as a source of power is largely due to the work of such
pioneering American engineers and inventors as Thomas Alva Edison, Nikola Tesla, and
Charles Proteus Steinmetz. Thomas Edison, whose development of a practical electric
light bulb, electric generating system, and other inventions had profound effects on the
shaping of modern society. [Ref. 1] Beyond the simple need for lighting, the tremendous
technological advances in modern warfare since World War II that have led to the ever
increasing need for electricity by the military to power all the latest equipment. These
advances in technology have allowed battlefield commanders ever-greater situational
awareness and command and control. Unfortunately, these modern marvels have caused
a dependency on electricity, without which, the modern commander could be rendered
helpless and blind. As we move into the 21 st Century, the requirements for electric power
are growing exponentially. [Ref. 2]
The Army's current answer to our electricity dependency is the latest generation
of military generators— the Tactical Quiet Generators (TQG). They were developed in
response to the changing military threats, new strategies, and fiscal constraints, which
dictated improved battlefield survivability, enhanced deployment/maintainability, and
reduced operating and support costs. This case study of the Mobile Electric Power's
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TQG fleet includes a short history in the development of the Project Manager's (PM-
MEP) office, military generators, and the requirements that today's military has for
generators. Next, the PM-MEP's acquisition strategy and problems will be presented.
Finally, the case study will investigate the production, fielding, and operational support
of the 5-60kW TQGs.
B. BACKGROUND OF MOBILE ELECTRIC AND POWER
In Korea, the Army's Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) units relied
heavily on the use of diesel generators to provide the needed electricity to save countless
lives. During Vietnam, the same need for electric power was present. The increasing
complexity of command and control structures far outpaced any Department of Defense
(DoD) development of a standard family of electrical generators. To supply their
increasing demand for electrical power, the U.S. Forces relied on a veritable potpourri of
over 2000 different makes and models of electrical generators. [Ref. 3] Standardization
and interoperability, even within each branch of Service, was virtually non-existent. In
1967 DoD created a Multi-Service Working Group to identify possible solutions to the
electrical power generator situation. The Working Group's study recommended that DoD
standardize generator use throughout all Services.
As a result, DoD promulgated DoD Directive 4120.1 1 (Standardization of Mobile
Electric Power Generating Sources) and created the office of the Project Manager Mobile
Electric Power (PM-MEP) to provide single project manager leadership to the DoD for
the acquisition of Mobile Electric Power Generating sources (MEPGS) and enforcement
of DODD 4120.11. The U.S. Army, being the largest user of MEPGS, became
responsible for program management, to include support of other Services.
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PM-MEP's mission statement is as follows:
Provide a modernized standard family of mobile electric power generators
for all Services throughout the Department of Defense. Accomplish this
mission through a coordinated inter-service effort to develop, acquire and
support Mobile Electric Power generators from small, 0.5kW manportable
generators to large, 920kW prime power generating systems. [Ref. 4]
The PM-MEP's first order of business was to standardize the existing fleet of
generators and gain some control over the logistics required to maintain this fleet. The
PM did this by identifying 69 different makes and models, both diesel and gasoline, that
constituted the "core" of DoD's Standard Family of Generators.
The development of a true Standard Family of Generators, now known as Military
Standard (MTL STD) began in the late 1960's. These generators were designed and
developed by the Government and during the early 1980s, further reduced the number of
makes and models in the core family to 37. These generators ranged from 0.5kW to
750kW, both diesel and gasoline, and served all branches throughout the 1970s, 1980s
and early 1990s. As these generators began to fail due to age, the PM-MEP began its
current tasking of providing a second generation of the DoD family ofMEPGS.
The push toward "jointness" among the Armed Services was an essential factor in
the design of this family of generators, as was the need for equipment that was more
reliable, maintainable, cheaper, and more mobile than the previous generation of
equipment. DoD also mandated the use of single fuel types (diesel/JP) in all ground
equipment, necessitating the standardization of fuel among the next generation of
generators.
C. REQUIREMENTS FOR NEW FAMILY OF GENERATORS
PM-MEP defined, via MIL-STD 1332B, the criteria used in classification of
engine generator sets, which make up the DoD Standard Family. The Family is broken
down into two general types and two classes. Type 1 (Tactical) are tactical generators
designed for high mobility in direct support of military forces where output of the
generator is normally used at generated voltage without further transformation or
distribution. Type 2 (Prime) are generators designed for long term use in semi-fixed
locations for extended periods of time, with size, weight and mobility considered
secondary to long life and reliability. Type 2 output is generally high voltage and
requires transformation and power distribution systems.
Class 1 (Precise) is generators designed to provide close control of voltage and
frequency performance for critical applications. Class 2 (Utility) is generators designed
to provide power for general-purpose applications. This class is further subdivided into
Utility A, B, and C, ranging from compatible with commercial distribution systems
(Class 2A) to that required for utilitarian purposes where requirements for voltage and
frequency control are minimal. [Ref. 5]
The second generation of MEPGS that PM-MEP was to undertake was a family
of Tactical Quiet Generators (TQG) from 3-60kW, which would have performance far
superior to any previous MEL STD generator of these sizes. These TQGs were to surpass
their predecessors with greater mobility, better reliability and maintainability, enhanced
survivability against a High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HAEMP), reduced infrared
and acoustic signatures, lower acquisition cost, and lower operation and support (O&S)
costs.
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Certain performance parameters were uniquely challenging to PM-MEP due to
the political atmosphere surrounding DoD programs. With the advent of DoD 5000.2-R,
and acquisition reform, as well as the movement away from military specifications, PM-
MEP was forced into an acquisition strategy essentially dictating the use of commercial
products with an Operational Requirement Document (ORD) that called for HAEMP
survivability, an aural signature of less than 400 meters, infrared detection minimization
for increased survivability, reduced fuel consumption, and lighter weight.
There are three other features that make military generators unique. First, based
on DoD's single fuel policy, all generators must be Diesel or JP fueled. Second, a 24-volt
system is required for compatibility with the military's vehicle fleet to provide the
capability to start vehicles. Third, unlike most commercial generators, these generators
must be able to operate in extreme environments, ranging from temperatures from -25 °F
to 125°F, with storage in temperatures ranging from -60°F to 160°F. Appendix A shows
each type of generator from 5kW to 60kW and information about each model.
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D. ACQUISITION STRATEGY
From the outset, PM-MEP tried to provide DoD with the "best value" generators
it needed at minimal cost, and they did this by attempting to use commercial items for
military applications.
"A commercial item is:
1. any item, customarily used for nongovernmental purposes, that has
been sold, leased, or licensed to the general public or that has been offered
for sale, lease, or license to the general public.
2. an item that evolved from a commercial item described in paragraph 1
above.
3. an item that meets the description in paragraph 1 above, but with minor
modifications to meet DoD needs or modifications of type normally done
for commercial customers.
4. any combination of items meeting this definition of commercial item, if
it is normally combined and sold commercially.
5
.
a service bought to support commercial items.
6. a service of a type offered and sold competitively in the commercial
market at catalog or market prices.
7. any item or service described in 1 through 6 above, even though it is
transferred between separate divisions of a contractor.
8. an item developed at private expense and sold in substantial quantities,
on a competitive basis, to state and local governments." [Ref. 6]
When commercial products are not available or appropriate, the military tries to
use non-developmental items (NDI). Below is the definition ofNDI.
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"A non-developmental item is: (1) any previously developed item of
supply used exclusively for governmental purposes by a Federal Agency,
a State or local government, or a foreign government with which the
United States has a mutual defense cooperation agreement; (2) any item
described in ( 1 ) that requires only minor modification or modifications of
the type customarily available in the commercial marketplace in order to
meet the requirements of the procuring department or agency; or (3) any
item described in (1) [previously developed item for a Federal Agency, a
State or local government, or a foreign government] or (2) [a modified
item] solely because the item is not yet in use." [Ref. 7]
Sometimes a commercial or non-developmental end item may not meet the
military's requirement. In such circumstances, integration of commercially available
components within the military design may be a good option to achieve the end result,
which is meeting the user's requirement. In this case the integration of commercially
available parts are used in creating an item that meets the government's specifications.
From this point forward this will be defined as Technology Integration. The PM-MEP
describes the use of Technical Integration in his Master Plan as:
"There are many readily available components that, when properly
designed/integrated and assembled into a new set, will satisfy stringent
physical and performance requirements of the tactical battlefield. This
approach relies on the use of either currently available commercial
technologies or integration of new technologies, as they become mature
and accepted in the commercial market place." [Ref. 2]
The PM-MEP has not had tremendous success along these lines and has suffered
several setbacks due in part to the requirements established for the TQG family and the
push to save research and development (R&D) money via the use of commercially
available equipment. Appendix B outlines the Federal Acquisition Regulation's
definition of a Commercial Item and Non Developmental Item. The decision process a
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Project Manger must go through before embarking on a developmental acquisition
strategy follows the definition.
The PM-MEP conducted numerous market surveys and investigations to
determine if commercially available technology could meet their stringent requirements.
Every survey and investigation concluded the same: commercial machines lack the
necessary robustness, features, characteristics, and performance required in military
generators. Yet, early on, they attempted to develop a generator from commercially
available parts.
In 1988 and 1989, the PM-MEP developed and released purchase descriptions for
a new family of generators, the TQGs. Libby Corporation won the contract to develop
the 5-60 kW generators. It only took Libby nine months to design the 5-60kW system
using NDI and Technology Integration. [Ref. 8]
Fermont Corporation won the contract for a new 3kW TQG. Unfortunately, due
to strict user performance requirements and an overly optimistic assessment of available
technology by the PM-MEP, a generator set that matched DoD's specifications was never
manufactured. In March 1992, a draft solicitation was issued for a two-step R&D
program aimed at designing a 3kW generator that was capable of meeting the
Government's needs. However, funding was never made available and the solicitation
was cancelled. [Ref. 9] Ultimately the 1989 3kW generator contract was terminated in
March 1995 for convenience of the Government due to the technical difficulties
discovered.
While PM-MEP has had difficulties throughout its existence, they continue to
rebound from failures, develop new strategies, and incorporate Acquisition Reform (AR)
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in nearly all aspects of business. PM-MEP's self-proclaimed approach to AR is based on
several tenets:
A common sense approach (don't do dumb things in the name of AR);
Challenging previous paradigms (but don't "throw the baby out with the
bath water");
Measured, continuous improvement (do what we can, but don't let the
process impede progress);
Tailoring AR to our unique industrial base sector (recognize its unique
problems/challenges);
Balancing AR with our DoD Standardization objectives;
AND always remember that the customer's needs remain pre-eminent.
[Ref. 10]
The PM-MEP continues to focus on what they call the "BIG ELEVEN" principles
of AR: Empowerment, Teamwork (Integrated Concept Teams/Integrated Production
Teams/Partnerships)(ICTs/IPTs), Performance Objectives and Thresholds, Acquisition
Tailoring, Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV), Preference for Commercial
Products/Components, "Best Practices," Minimizing Government Specifications and
Standards, Hierarchy of Materiel Alternatives, Best Value Awards, and Value Added
Test and Evaluation. ICTs were used in the redesign of the 3 kW TQG ORE), essentially
using a minimum of mandatory thresholds coupled with desired objective requirements to
give the industry the flexibility it needs in the development of a generator set that meets
DoD's needs and permits "Best Value" assessment of offers. Mil Specs on the 3kW TQG
were reduced from 199 to 80. Roughly, 85-95% of the components in most of the

















Figure 1 . Acquisition Strategy [From Ref. 2]
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E. PRODUCTION/FIELDING
Most people are unaware of how large and extensive the DoD generator fleet is.
The DoD fleet from 2kW to 920kW consists of 83,099 generators and is worth in excess
of $1.4 billion. Of this fleet, the Army is the largest user with 63,976 generators, of
which, 37,961 generators are in the 5kW to 60kW ranges and 25,458 are in the 2-3kW
size. Accordingly, producing, fielding and supporting this many generators is a huge
project. [Ref. 11]
The first fielding of TQGs was the family of generators from 5-60kW, which
began in December 1993. Since then, the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and several
allied nations have purchased and fielded TQGs. The following figure was the schedule
for the initial Production/Fielding of the 5-60kW TQGs:
Event FY 88 FY 89 FY 90 FY 91 FY 92 FY 93 FY 94

























Figure 2. Initial Production/Fielding Plan for 5-60kW TQGs [From Ref. 12]
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F. PROVISIONING, PROCUREMENT, AND PRODUCTION OF INITIAL
SPARES
The Army uses the Total Package Fielding (TPF) process to field new material
systems and their needed support items. [Ref. 13] This process was,
designed to ensure thorough planning and coordination between Combat
Developers/Trainers, Materiel Developers/Fielding Commands and the
gaining Major Army Commands and using units involved in the fielding
of new materiel systems. At the same time, it is designed to ease the
logistics burden on the using and supporting Army troop units. [Ref. 14]
TPF minimizes the workload associated with fielding of new equipment
by requiring the Materiel Developer/Fielding Command to do the up-front
determination of all requirements, the funding and requisitioning of nearly
all needed items, the consolidation of the support items into unit level
packages, and the coordinated distribution of the major system, its
Associated Support Items of Equipment (ASIOE) and the support
packages to a central staging site or the unit itself. [Ref. 14]
All fieldings are conducted in accordance with formal Materiel Fielding Plans
(MFP). The MFP is a memorandum of agreement between the PM-MEP and the Major
Command. It covers the "who, what, where, when, and how of the fielding process."
The Materiel Requirements List for the new equipment shows everything needed to use
and support the new system. It includes the new system, comprising all component major
items and Basic Issue Items, ASIOE, Special Tools and Test Equipment (STTE), Test
Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE), computed and authorized initial issue
spare/repair parts (for the Authorized Stockage List (ASL) level only), and a starter set of
technical publications. Furthermore, the TPF finalizes the staging, handoff, and New
Equipment Training (NET) schedule and locations with the gaining unit. [Ref. 14]
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An ASL is stored at the direct support maintenance level and is comprised of
essential repair parts and major assemblies required to support the force as far forward in
the combat area as the supported units can tactically secure. ASL items are determined
by demand history, resupply turnaround time, and cargo lift availability. It is normally a
30-day supply of parts. During fielding a push package of parts is given to the direct
support unit for inclusion in their ASL until the demand history is built up. In the case of
the 101
st
Airborne Division, the 801 st Main Support Battalion was given an ASL push
package, but the Forward Support Battalions did not receive a push package. The push
package contains items that are needed based on predicted Mean Time Between Failures
(MTBF) of the components, Developmental/Operational testing (DT/OT) testing, and
service requirements.
Prescribed Load List (PLL) is a 1 5 day supply of parts that is demand supported
(need to be ordered three times in 90 days.) The repair parts are normally stored at the
Battalion level motor pool. The parts are normally for services on equipment and repairs
at that level. For the purpose of this study the actual parts given to units for their PLL is
not discussed, since the amount is insignificant.
TQGs were fielded under the TPF process. The MFP described the elements
necessary to complete a successful fielding. The fielding process began with advance
party from the PM-MEP arriving to negotiate with the fielding unit six to nine months
ahead of fielding. Deprocessing and handoff procedures were established; facilities
arranged for training; and PLL/ASL/Manuals requirements were validated to ensure the
correct quantities were delivered. The next step was on-site deprocessing, New
Equipment Training (NET), and handoff of generators, manuals, parts, STTE, TMDE,
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and ASIOE. [Ref. 15] Figure 3, is the schedule for the major logistics activities during
the Engineering and Manufacturing Developmental Phase of the 5-60kW generators.
This supported the First Unit Equipped (FUE) (December 1993) at Fort Bragg, NC. The
total package and handoff in white triangles at the bottom of the schedule reflect what
happened at Fort Campbell, KY.







Nov 88 Apr 91
A A
Apr -Aug 91 Jan/Mar/Jun 92 Jul 93
A A AAA A A
Tech Manuals Sep- Nov 89 Apr/Jun/Sep 92 May 93 Nov 93


















Oct 93 Jun 94
AA A




Figure 3. Initial Total Package Fielding Plan for 5-60 kW TQGs [From Ref. 12]
G. THE CRUNCH
Although the TPF concept briefed well, there were some problems with the
concept. One of the problems of the TQG fielding was the ASL stock for initial fielding.
Originally, the logistics managers for the PM-MEP looked at the support list allowance
card, the provisioning master record, and data on every part from the contractor, as well
as failure rates during testing. From this they came up with a list of 105-120 line items to
be used as ASL for the fielded units. The Army would not allow the system to go to
materiel release until the information was run through the SESAME computer model.
So, the ASL stock for the initial fielding was based on the SESAME computer model,
which considered part criticality and failure modes/rates from
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Developmental/Operational testing. The SESAME computer model was not really
designed for this purpose. Rather, it was designed to look at what is the actual failure and
identifying the smallest part to replace, since it was originally created for budgeting for
the repair of end items. For example, if a starter was the part that failed, but it was
actually the bearings in the starter that had worn out, the model would recommend that
the bearings be stocked, assuming the maintenance activity is able to perform these
repairs. The ASL package had to be increased to support the SESAME model
predictions. The PM had to take roughly $50,000-5100,000 from the production account
in order to increase funding for the repair parts. [Ref. 16]
Another problem was that the program timeline slipped. When the logistics
managers had their provisioning conference, the technical drawings for the system were
not complete; testing was not finished and the data was incomplete to support
provisioning decisions. The logistics planning time and logistics package ended up being
the bill payer for the time crunch and were sacrificed in order to keep the project to its
original fielding schedule. [Ref. 16]
In addition, the stockage levels in the push packages were not designed with
enough depth to sustain maintenance operations until the warranty returns were received
nor did they bridge the time until the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) had enough
demands to begin contracting for the parts.
The PM-MEP ensured the initial provisioning/supply support requests (SSR) were
provided to and accepted by DLA before the first units fielded. In the case of the 82d
Airborne Division at Ft. Bragg, the first unit to be fielded in December 1993, the PM had
to pull parts off the production line in order to give the units the full ASL package. [Ref.
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16] In the case of the 101
st
Airborne Division, (the third unit to be fielded the TQGs) the
Main Support Battalion was fielded an ASL of roughly 384 parts, worth $10,274.36 in
1994 dollars. [Ref. 17] The problem with the push package was that the highest quantity
of any one part received was five, so there was not much depth. Additionally, since the
ASL was based on the computer model and operational testing— it left out the "Snuffy
and Murphy rules" factors. The Snuffy rule is that the computer can only compute on
average mean failure rates of normal running, not the abuse/misuse of soldiers.
Furthermore, the Murphy rule is that the computer cannot forecast for what you really
need while you are out in the field, for most often that is when something is going to
happen and you need the part right away.
H. WARRANTY
Another way to ease the logistics burden of newly fielded units is to have a
warranty that will bridge the time until the Services field enough generators to build up
demands. In this case, the PM-MEP did not want the warranty program to become a
substitute for the supply support system. The PM-MEP stated that,
warranties on military systems are not part of the military logistics
systems, nor are they intended as supplements or substitutes for them.
Warranties are designed to protect the government against major
production deficiencies in new military products—and to incentivize
quality production by contractors/vendors. In essence, the DoD Warranty
Program was not designed to enhance readiness. Thus, the timeframes
and processes are developed to support the integrity of the acquisition
process, rather than specifically as support to the logistics system....
Second, warranties are very, very expensive to include in contracts....
Depending on the item and terms of the warranty the costs can range
anywhere from 1 to 10+% of the acquisition cost. [Ref. 18]
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The warranty for the TQGs failed to meet the Fort Campbell needs in three ways.
The first was the time limitations. The stated warranty duration was 1800 operating
hours or thirty-six months. This was insufficient to meet the Operational Tempo
(OPTEMPO) for a division that has a brigade that goes to the field for three weeks of
every month. Eighteen hundred hours equates to 78 days of use in the field. A brigade
would surpass the operating hour limitations in less than 12 months. The second problem
was with the financial charges. Once a part was "found" to be unserviceable it was sent
to the contractor. If the contractor found the part serviceable, they would charge the unit
$1,000.00. Generators are sometimes the hardest pieces of equipment to diagnose and
multiple malfunctions can cause mechanics to misdiagnose parts as being bad. There was
no honest broker to determine if the contractor was telling the truth. Finally, the prime
contractor had 45 days to provide failure analysis upon receiving the item. Additionally,
the prime contractor had up to 60 days to return a repaired or replaced item after the
analysis is complete. A time period of 105 days was too long for part replacement. As
stated the ASL push package did not possess sufficient depth to wait for items to go
through a 105-day cycle for return to serviceable stock in the ASL.
The PM-MEP's solution for the unit was to spend the money and order the part
and hope it came in faster than the one from the contractor and put the one that came in
from the contractor on the unit's ASL; this could possibly create excess and cause the
division to unnecessarily spend money. This was the likely outcome whenever the
needed part did not have enough demands for it while it was under review. [Ref. 9]
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I. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This case study of the Mobile Electric Power's TQG fleet demonstrates that this
piece of equipment, although not as prominent as the Seawolf submarine or B-2 bomber,
is nevertheless critical to mission success. The requirements that today's military has for
generators will continue to increase as information technology demands ever more
electrical power. The need for electrical power crosses every Service line and spans
every mission and function of the Armed Forces. The PM-MEP is constantly trying to
break technology barriers, develop creative acquisition strategy, and implement programs
for the present and future DoD Standard Family of Generators. All this effort is to
achieve the goal of ensuring that no commander losses the battle because he or she did
not have the right power at the right place and time. It is in the quest of this goal that the
PM-MEP has experienced many difficulties in his acquisition strategy and contracting
practices. The PM-MEP's pursuit of acquisition reform initiatives and ability to "bounce
back" after setbacks in the early 1990s have allowed the office to become an award
winning PM-MEP office within DoD. They were awarded the 1995 U.S. Army Materiel
Command Project Manager of the Year Award and the 1996 DoD Project Manager of the
Year Award. It is apparent that the PM-MEP has made tremendous progress and
overcome great obstacles, yet there is still room to improve their way of doing business
as they develop programs for the future. The next two chapters will further investigate
what really went wrong with the fielding of the TQGs, particularly at Fort Campbell and
what could be done to fix the situation.
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HI. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE OF THE TACTICAL QUIET
GENERATOR
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss the problems with the TQG fielding at Fort Campbell,
KY and analyze maintenance and supply issues that surrounded the fielding. Readiness
issues compiled by the PM-MEP's office and Decisions and Advanced Technology
Associates (DATA) as well as current readiness reports will be used to illustrate the
situation. This will be followed by maintenance reports, which further describe some of
the maintenance and supply problems. Subsequently, there will be a discussion about the
initial ASL fielding package and how the ASL fielding package has evolved. Early and
revised ASL fielding packages will be compared to current demand history. The chapter
will finish with a description ofthe issues surrounding the Defense Logistics Agency.
B. EQUIPMENT READINESS ISSUES OF TACTICAL QUIET
GENERATOR SINCE FIELDING
The PM-MEP's office contracted with DATA to collect information on the TQG.
DATA found two issues which directly affect the TQG's reliability usage and load
utilization. As depicted in Figure 7, DATA found that generators are 7 times more
reliable when operated more than 50 hrs per month than those operated less than 20 hrs
per month. Although, when looking at their chart, it looks like generators have higher
Mean Time Between Unscheduled Event (MTBUE) at 31-40 operating hours. Figure 4
depicts normal equipment utilization. It shows 55% of all generators are utilized less
than 10 hrs per month. Generators are operated under feast or famine conditions. Either
they have a whole lot of use or none at all. Basically, they are only used when out in the
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field. As shown in Figure 6, generators are twice as reliable when operated above 60%
load utilization compared to those operated at 0-20% load utilization. However, their
study revealed that over two-thirds of operation occurs at less than 40% load utilization
as depicted in Figure 5. [Ref. 21] Even if generators are operated at the recommended
50 hrs per month, it does not mean that the generators are operating at the full load rate.
Underloading causes "wetstacking" which is "the buildup of unburned diesel fuel and
carbon residues in the engine and exhaust system of diesel engines including generator
sets." [Ref. 22] Solutions to this problem include increasing power loads and reducing
the number of generators used. Both such solutions are easier said than done, especially
if you are trying to disperse tactically in an area. Underloading is sometimes the only
option when you do not have a smaller generator available or anything else to plug into
the generator to increase load utilization. Other causes of poor operations and
maintenance are the lack of operator and maintenance training. This continues to be a
leadership challenge with high personnel turnover rates and short time in between field
problems. [Ref. 22]
In general, power requirements for generators are overstated, resulting in
generators being operated at low electrical loads. This results in aggravated maintenance
and supportability issues that will ultimately drive up acquisition costs as well as
operations and support (O&S) costs. There are a number of systemic issues contributing
to this problem: users over-estimating power requirements (such as using initial peak
power vice sustaining power), poor power load and distribution management, assuming
all systems operate simultaneously at maximum load (which is rarely, if ever, the case),
and assuming "worst-case" environmental/altitude conditions. Users want to "safe side"
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their requirements and consequently request too many generators in too large sizes for the
applications intended. Also, they want "redundancy" to ensure continuity of operations
and the capability to operate independently. [Ref. 2]
The TQG was initially fielded at Ft. Bragg. Figure 8 shows the operational
readiness rates over a three-year period at Ft. Bragg and a one-year period at Ft. Hood.
The operational readiness (OR) rate is above 90% and in a real world deployment to
Haiti, the OR rate exceeded 89%. 90% OR is the Army's standard, but this researcher
feels it should be closer to the 98% rate for a new system that has been in use for at least
two years. In fact it ranges from as low as 92% to as high as 97.6%. A new system
should perform at a consistently high rate. When all models are averaged together, their
overall OR rate is 95%. The following figures depict the utilization rates, readiness rates,
and mean time between unscheduled events:
EQUIPMENT UTILIZATION
m% of Total Generators
55% of generators are
utilized less than
10 hours per month.
Mean Monthly U sage (Op Hrs)
Figure 4. Equipment Utilization [From Ref. 21]
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OPERATING LOAD UTILIZATION
GENSET 0-20% 21-40% 41-60% 61-80% 80-100%
5kW 50.8% 27.4% 10.7% 7.8% 3.3%
lOkW 37.0% 46.3% 4.8% 8.0% 3.9%
15kW 49.7% 29.7% 15.3% 3.8% 1.5%
30kW 31.4% 35.2% 15.3% 12.4% 5.7%
60kW 59.6% 23.4% 12.8% 4.2% 0.0%
Over all two-thirds, of operations occurred at less than 40% load!
Figure 5. Operating Load Utilization [From Ref. 21]
MEAN TIME BETWEEN UNSCHEDULED EVENTS
<50 2MO <*V-eO GT-80
LOAD PERCENTAGE
Generators are twice as reliable when
operated at' ove 60%load--
compared to those operated at 0%
to 20% load
Unscheduled event = any event that
occurs, not necessarily critical, nor
doe sit mean that the set won't
operate.
Figure 6. Mean Time Between Unscheduled Events [From Ref. 21]
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Generators are 7 times more reliable when operated more than
50 hrs/month vs those operated less than 20 hrs/month.
Figure 7. Mean Time Between Unscheduled Events Vs Usage Rates [From Ref. 21]
OPERATIONAL READINESS RATES
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Data is from Sample Data
Collectionpopulation of
1344 sets for 3 years at
Fort Bragg and 1 year at
Fort Hood.
During hard, real-world use
in Haiti, the OR rate
exceeded 89%.
Figure 8. Operational Readiness Rates [From Ref. 21]
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C. CURRENT READINESS ISSUES OF THE TACTICAL QUIET
GENERATOR
Below is a snapshot of statistics complied by the Army's Logistics Support
Activity (LOGSA). These statistics were gathered between 1995 and 1998. LOGSA
receives all the Army units' monthly readiness reports of reportable equipment. All
reports become part of the Readiness Integrated Data Base (RIDB). A normal readiness
report depicts a month long readiness rate and is the relationship between the amount of
days the equipment is Fully Mission Capable (FMC) (working) and total possible days it
could be working. It is expressed as a percentage. The Department of the Army standard
is a 90% or better Fully Mission Capable rate. Not Mission Capable for Supply (NMCS)
means the item is unserviceable due to a lack of repair part(s). NMCS is also expressed
as a percentage and in this case, it is the ratio of days waiting on parts to total possible
days the system could be working. Not Mission Capable for Maintenance (NMCM), like
NMCS, is a ratio, but it is time spent waiting on a mechanic to fix the equipment to total
possible days the system could be working. For example, for a 30-day report period, if a
unit has six generators authorized and six generators on hand, the total possible days they
could be working is 180 days (6x30). If these generators had only 111 days available,
and 62 days NMCS and 7 days NMCM, these generators would have a FMC of 62%
(1 1 1/180) with a NMCS of 34% (62/180) and aNMCM of4% (7/180).
Despite the maintenance problems of the TQGs, readiness has stayed above the
90%. The charts below depict a study of seven different models of TQGs — PU 797 (5
kW), PU 798 (10 kW), PU 802 (15 kW), PU 803 (30 kW), MEP 802A (5 kW), MEP
803A(10 kW) and MEP 805A (30 kW). The reason for using only seven generators
instead of the 26 different models in the entire family was that each of these TQGs had
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more than 200 items fielded to Active Army units. In this case these statistics are just for
generators in the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). U.S. Army Forces
Command is the largest major command in the Department of the Army and comprises
the Army component of U.S. Atlantic Command. FORSCOM supervises the training of
more than 760,000 active and reserve soldiers to provide a strategic, power-projection
ground force capable of responding rapidly and successfully to crises worldwide.
Since this thesis is based on the fielding of Fort Campbell, which belongs to
FORSCOM, the FORSCOM statistics were used. As stated in Chapter 2 these generators
were first fielded in 1993 to the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, which is also one of
FORSCOM' s units. Readiness reporting did not become mandatory until 4th quarter
1995, so some units had their generators for almost two years without reporting their
readiness data. These statistics also are rolled up into quarterly averages, rather than
monthly reports. As you can see on the graphs below, in the FMC rate varied from as
low as 80% to as high as 100%. In the case of the MEP 805A there were 5 generators on
hand during the 4th quarter of 1995 and they had a FMC rate of 80%. The low density of
generators and the fact that one generator could have been down the whole time would
create the poor rating. With these reports, high equipment density may mask long down
times. Conversely, low-density statistics may be easily depressed by long down times.
With new systems, the norm is to expect high and stable FMC rates. This has not been
the case with the TQG. The rates do vary greatly over the four years. Mr. Londene, a
LOGSA analyst, said, "if an item is new, one would expect it to run well for a longer
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When looking at the amount of time spent non-mission capable for supply versus
maintenance in Figures 11-17 the charts clearly show the supply days are higher. This is
an indicator that there is a problem with the supply system, but does not tell us whether it
is due to parts not being available in the system or not. In looking for a trend, the curves
do not go up or down, just fluctuate. Yet, the days awaiting supply are almost always
worse than the days requiring maintenance.
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Figure 11. FORSCOM PU 797 Non Mission Capable [After Ref. 23]
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Figure 13. FORSCOM PU 802 Non Mission Capable [After Ref. 23]











QTR QTR QTR QTR QTR QTR QTR QTR QTR QTR QTR QTR QTR
95 96 96 96 96 97 97 97 97 98 98 98 98
TIME
Figure 14. FORSCOM PU 803 Non Mission Capable [After Ref.23]
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Figure 15. FORSCOM MEP 802 Non Mission Capable [After Ref.23]
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Figure 16. FORSCOM MEP 803 Non Mission Capable [After Ref. 23]
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Figure 17. FORSCOM MEP 805 Non Mission Capable [After Ref. 23]
Readiness rates are further aggravated by are variances in the quantities on hand.
Figure 1 8 shows dramatic drops in the quantities reported. Quantities should be flat or
rising, but this is not the case. From one period to the next the number of generators on
hand normally increases, but in some instances it goes down dramatically. For example,
with the MEP 803 from 3d quarter 1997, the on hand quantity went from 414 to 324 and
then in 1
st
and 2d quarter of 1998 went to as low as 13 and eventually back up to 504 in
3d quarter 1998. The statistics demonstrate reporting disparities. Basically, there has
been incomplete reporting.
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Figure 18. FORSCOM Quantity On Hand [After Ref. 23]
D. MAINTENANCE ISSUES OF THE TACTICAL QUIET GENERATOR
Another source of information on the performance of the Tactical Quiet Generator
is to look at the Work Order Logistics File (WOLF). The WOLF is a database of Direct
Support and General Support (DS & GS) maintenance actions and related information.
Data is gathered from the Standard Army Maintenance System (SAMS), which is used at
the DS and GS maintenance units. The WOLF has data available back to 1995 and
archived back to 1990. It allows research of Maintenance Turnaround Times (MTAT)
and other significant information such as Mean Time To Repair (MTTR)(i.e., wrench
turning time), average wait for repair parts, total work orders, total downtime, and total
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repair parts downtime. In this study, data for six models of generators, the MEP 802A,
PU 798, PU 802, MEP 805, PU 803, and AN/MJQ-37 was complied from 1995 to 1998.
Looking at the total work order count in Figure 1 9 below, the annual work order trend is
decreasing with a slight increase in 1997. This could be indicative of the system
operating better as it matures. Or, it could be poor reporting as is the case in Figure 18.
In Figure 20, the Mean Time to Repair is contrasted against Mean Turn Around
Time. This clearly indicates wrench-turning time is not really significant. In fact, the
highest is five days, while the highest MTAT is 77.4 days. If you subtract MTTR from
MTAT the best is 9.8 days and the worse is 72.4 days. This indicates a problem with the
supply system responding with the required repair parts. It could also indicate a problem
with actually diagnosing what is wrong with the generator. That is, the mechanics could
be ordering the wrong parts, wasting valuable downtime.
Additionally, New Equipment Training (NET) for mechanics and operators often
happens six months to a year before receiving the equipment. NET is normally not
purposely scheduled to occur so far in advance, but fielding often gets pushed back after
training has been conducted. The time between training and fielding can aggravate the
NMC statistics, not to mention making the learning curve steeper for both mechanics and
operators.
Figure 21 depicts the average days waiting for parts. The worst case is 35.13
days, with the best being 4.33 days. This clearly depicts a problem with the supply
system responding to the needs of the mechanics. By 1998 the supply system should
have been able to react and the supply statistics should have looked relatively flat. The
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WOLF statistics depicted in Figures 1 9-2 1 clearly show there is a supply problem and the
situation does not appear to be getting any better.
TOTAL WORK ORDER COUNT
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
5 6 7 8 5 6 7 8 5 6 7 8 5 6 7 8 5 6 7 8 5 6 7 8
MEP 802A PU798 PU 802 MEP 805
YEAR AND MODEL
PU803 MJQ-37
Figure 19. FORSCOM Work Order Count [After Ref. 24]
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MEAN TIME TO REPAIR AND MEAN TURNAROUND TIME
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1111 11119999 99999999 99995678 5678
PU 803 MJQ-37
Figure 20. Mean Time to Repair and Mean Turnaround Time [After Ref. 24]
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Figure 21 . Average Wait For Parts [After Ref. 24]
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In fact, when considering failure-rate trends on a relative basis using the bathtub
curve shown in the illustration below, one would expect the generators to be in a constant
failure rate region after being fielded for two years. [Ref. 25] In fact, most of the
debugging should have been taken care of during the first two years, which is part of the
infant mortality period. The trends shown in Figures 11-17 and Figures 20 and 21 are
very consistent. Although not exactly the same, the indications are the same. The figures
support the argument that the problem is not really reliability and failure rates, but, in
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Bathtub Curve Based on Time-Dependent Failure Rate
Figure 22. Bathtub Curve [From Ref. 25]
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E. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SPARE PARTS PUSH PACKAGE
1. Original Fielding Package
As stated in Chapter 2 the original ASL package consisted of 224 lines of parts
for the 101 st Airborne Division, for a total amount of 384 parts stocked. The original
package was based on the SEASAME model's recommendations. To actually see how
effective this package was, the Tactical Quiet Generator Item Manager at DLA ran the
National Stock Numbers (NSN) through their computer to see current demands for these
lines. The Class EX Accountable Officer at Fort Campbell ran the same lines to show the
division's demands for those same lines. Both computer files only went back two years
(1998 and 1999). In the case of DLA, only 121 of the 224 lines had more than 10
demands. This meant that the old package was less than 54% effective, DoD-wide.
Some of these parts could be common to other items driving up the demands, but
provides a way to check the ASL. Ft. Campbell showed that 45 lines were demand
supported. This shows an effective rate of 20%. In an interview with CW5 (Ret.) Art
Lacky, who was a supply tech for the Army and spent numerous years at Ft. Campbell,
he said it was his experience to turn in over 70% of an original push package as excess
within two years of fielding. These numbers clearly paint that picture. Appendix D





45 total lines are
demand supported
at Fort Campbell
4 lines are demand
supported at Ft.
Campbell and have less
than 10 demands at
DLA
Number of original
repair part lines for
the ASL
4 1 lines are
demand supported
at DLA and Fort
Campbell
384 parts for $10,274 in FY 1993
Figure 22. Initial Fielding Package [After Refs. 26, 17, 28]
2. New Fielding Package
As stated in Chapter 2, the new fielding package was based on actual field
experience and usage data from Ft. Bragg over eighteen months and came up with a list
of 49 lines of parts. The PM used Ft. Bragg's demand experience after receiving a lot of
criticism that their fielding package had been ineffective. The PM is currently using this
revised package in its fieldings overseas. Appendix E shows the new fielding package,
which has been tailored around the number and type of generators fielded to Ft.
Campbell. The new package has 49 lines of parts. Sized for Ft. Campbell's
requirements, this would mean 515 total parts at a cost of $18,480.64 in 1999 dollars.
There are 30 lines on the revised list that were on the old list; 19 lines are new. Of these
30 lines, 19 lines were demand supported. This would give it a 63% (19/30) effective
rating of the 30 original lines. The other 19 new lines were not run by Ft. Campbell or
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DLA to see their effectiveness. Given this incomplete picture, the bottom line is that the
new package is better, but not perfect. If the 63% is any indicator, there are still excess
parts being turned in, but 63% is still better than 20% effectiveness.
Number of old parts
on new list
Number of repair






515 parts for $18,480 in 1999
Figure 23. New Fielding Package [After Refs. 26, 17, 28]
F. DLA AND AGGREVATED SUPPLY PROBLEMS
Prior to the onset of fielding, DLA was given the National Stock Numbers for all
the parts in the TQGs. They were also given failure rates. Unfortunately, DLA is only
funded to stock about 85% and the Army National Inventory Control Point (NICP) is
funded to stock about 80% of their current needs. DLA is funded to buy, stock, and sell
only consumable items, which are items used to repair the more complex assemblies and
systems. There is an enormous amount of money involved in managing parts and the
overhead incurred to store and ship them. Due to budget constraints, DLA will only buy
parts for actual demands and will not buy parts to support newly fielded items until real
demands materialize. Furthermore, there is a high degree of variability in the demand
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patterns of the more than three and one half million spare and repair parts managed by
DLA. [Ref. 29] Because of unpredicted failure of weapon systems and unexpected
changes to operating tempo (OPTEMPO), Service demand does not always occur as
predicted by their models. "Unforecasted demands result in short term parts shortages
and backorders." [Ref. 29] Given the range and age of the DoD's many weapon systems
and equipment, it is difficult to forecast perfectly the parts that will be required, some of
which take a long time to place on contract and manufacture. In general, DLA stocks are
demand-based, and without sufficient demands, DLA cannot enter into contracts
established with suppliers. DLA also has to put the contract out for bid, allowing
competition. This means the company that is actually making the parts for production
might not actually make them for the supply system. The parts made by other companies
normally meet the same specifications, but there are usually longer lead times due to
required set up times. Additionally, "many of the repair parts that DLA manages are not
used in commercial industry, but are instead unique to the Military Services." [Ref. 29]
Many high-tech parts, such as those used in turbine engines, require vendors to acquire
special materials and conduct special production runs, adding months to the lead-time for
parts acquisition.
About two years ago, DLA underwent a fundamental change and began to
manage parts under weapon system alignment. This allowed DLA to forecast parts
requirements and work lead-time issues between customers and suppliers. This strategy
allowed them to develop a comprehensive plan to apply funds and achieve the maximum
benefit on a weapon systems basis. DLA was able to determine, through analysis of
weapon system availability data, the need for additional investment in spare parts. They
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then began the process of contracting for the needed parts. Although the support for parts
is good in the aggregate, they have found individual items with less than satisfactory
support. Through teaming, the Services and DLA can address variability in demand,
provide more on-time deliveries, and quicker response on repair parts requested by the
Services. [Ref. 29]
Another problem is units using alternate sources of supply (such as credit cards)
and failing to enter the demands into the supply system, thereby not building up DLA's
demand history. Currently, the PM-MEP has bridged the gap by allowing units to
purchase parts directly from the contractor by credit card, but only for items that will not
adversely impact production within the next 60 days. This solution was not available
during the first years of the fielding because the PM had not worked out this arrangement
with the contractor. [Ref. 30]
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY
There are many issues surrounding the support of new systems. This chapter
covered five diverse topics, but all are necessary in order to really understand the TQG
support. This chapter depicted the symptoms of a problem in regards to support. First, it
covered equipment utilization rates and the operating load utilization and their impact on
readiness. Although any lessons on utilization rates and operating load utilization might
only pertain to generators, the more general lesson is that not all flaws are found in
testing; therefore, the Project Manager must quickly react to the "unpleasant surprises"
that occur during fielding. Second, this chapter discussed readiness issues and how
problems in reporting shroud the situation and possibly hide emerging trends. Third, it
addressed maintenance issues and challenges faced with repairing the equipment. Fourth,
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the chapter analyzed the old and current ASL fielding packages as to their effectiveness.
Finally, it described DLA's organization and practices and how DLA has improved the
supply system response to maintenance needs. At best, fielding a new system is complex
and there are many opportunities to make mistakes. However, there are some alternative
approaches to fielding a system that might provide more responsive support to the user.
The next chapter will examine potential solutions to more smoothly transition
from initial fielding to continuous support. Each option has certain benefits and deciding
what has the best overall value for the Government and the user is the challenge.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF LOGISITICS SUPPORT
A. INTRODUCTION
There are many factors that should be considered when making decisions for
supporting a new system. Taking the time to plan upfront will mitigate some of the
problems that field customers might otherwise needlessly endure. The challenge may be
more difficult when the system is a Non-Developmental Item or uses an integration of
commercial components in a military design (which will be defined as Technology
Integration from this point forward.) In these cases, the acquisition timelines and
logistics planning are compressed and there may be insufficient time to put the necessary
support structure in place. The following discussion will describe some of the support
challenges incurred with Technology Integration/NDI. This will be followed by
examining the pros and cons of three alternative means of support that can be used in
order to bridge the gap between initial fielding and a mature, responsive supply system.
Warranties, contractor logistics support, and prime vendor support are the areas
investigated. The chapter will conclude with some explanation of how these alternatives
might have been used to bridge the support gap for the Tactical Quiet Generator (TQG).
B. SUPPORT CHALLENGES
The relatively short lead times required for fielding Non-Developmental items and
Technology Integration items mean that getting the necessary support in place requires
non-traditional thinking about support. Although there is relatively little opportunity to
lessen the burden of logistics support by influencing the design of these items, the
acquiring agency can, by using supportability as one of the selection criteria, influence
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the selection process. PMs need to recognize the inherent supportability risk of a Non
Developmental item or Technology Integration. A significant part of the market
investigation is to ensure that the system can be made compatible with military
operations and its support infrastructure. Given these inherent program risks in the areas
of life-cycle cost and supportability, an acquisition decision must not be made until
tradeoff factors are identified, analyzed, and compared with other alternatives. [Ref. 31]
1. Configuration Management And Control
Configuration management and control must be carefully evaluated when
considering Technology Integration and NDI alternatives. The ability of the user to
adjust to possible configuration changes beyond his or her control, or even configuration
visibility, is a major consideration. Over time, other users, commercial or military, will
drive changes to the item that can affect the user's ability to support the item. One aspect
of configuration management is modifications. Minimizing modifications to a
Technology Integration or NDI item preserves the option of using the existing support
system. As an item is modified, existing support deteriorates quickly and support
becomes more difficult. Another aspect of configuration management is upgrades.
Competitive pressure and evolving technology result in frequent product changes and
improvements. Therefore, support plans should allow for frequent product upgrades or
change-outs. [Ref. 31]
2. Logistics Support Planning
Technology Integration/NDI supportability is an issue that must be addressed up
front before the item is fielded. When selecting a Technology Integration or NDI item,
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one cannot ignore any element of logistics support. The support elements must be
thoroughly assessed during the market investigation because logistics support remains a
critical factor. The major steps required to ensure that adequate logistics planning has
taken place are described below. [Ref. 3 1 ]
LOGISTICS PLANNING STEPS
Step 1 . Review operational requirements.
Step 2. Identify and obtain support data.
Step 3. Analyze support data.
Step 4. Make operational assessment decision.
Step 5. Provide for interim support, and develop interim support plan.
Step 6. Develop and assess final support plan. [Ref. 31]
3. Logistics Support Elements
The unique support considerations of Technology Integration items and NDI must
be evaluated within the context of the logistics support elements. There are many
opportunities and challenges associated with maintenance and supply planning. When
developing a maintenance plan, manufacturers of commercial items may be willing and
able to support their products with preventive maintenance, repair parts, and technical
personnel through the item's expected service life. If organic support is unavoidable, the
initial maintenance concept must identify criteria and subsequent maintenance concepts
and formulate transition plans when required. Supportability analyses form the basis of
good maintenance planning. When determining supply support one needs to capitalize
on the availability of item history and previous user experience in determining supply
support. Manufacturer data and other historical usage data may significantly aid in the
accurate prediction of initial provisioning requirements for repair parts and related
support equipment and help estimate follow-on provisioning needs. However, military-
unique modifications to a Technology Integration item or NDI or military usage factors
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may invalidate manufacturer data and other historical data. Usage factors include service
life, environment, and other factors that may differ between the intended military
application and the original design application. Acquisition managers should also take
into consideration the possible obsolescence or discontinuance of production of the
replacement parts needed to sustain or repair fielded hardware. Alternative supply
methods should be investigated and employed where cost-effective. [Ref. 31]
It is quite clear that there are some serious challenges to be faced when using
Technology Integration/NDI, such as little chance to influence the design, configuration
management issues if the design must be changed, as well as maintenance and supply
planning problems. In the case of the TQG, it seems the PM-MEP understood that the
Program Office could not influence the design due to its NDI approaches. The PM-MEP
was in fact, quite aware of configuration management issues, but tried to upgrade the
technology where it made sense to keep pace with new emerging applications. The PM-
MEP 's technology assessment was based on current ongoing investigations and lessons
learned by the MEP staff. This assessment evaluated engines, alternators, control
systems, and structural technologies in terms of potential to be integrated in the near, mid
and long term. PM-MEP engineers continue to monitor the progress of all emerging
technology innovations and identify cost-effective opportunities as the technology
becomes commercially marketable [Ref. 2:p. 75].
The support challenges began with the PM-MEP 's logistics support plan. It is
apparent that the PM-MEP 's logistic support plan was to have the ASL push package
support the system in the field and wait for the supply system to mature. They did not
have an interim support plan in place during the period when the supply system was
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maturing. From the data in Chapter 3, it clearly shows that supply support planning was
inadequate. The following section will describe various methods that could have been
used as an interim support plan.
C. WARRANTIES
Warranties were examined as a means to cover the gap between initial fielding
and a mature supply system. Decisions in regards to warranties made during each
acquisition phase can affect the remaining system life cycle. The program manager
should understand the long-range impacts of early warranty decisions. A warranty is not
undertaken without risk to both the Government and the contractors. Risks may be
mitigated through appropriate activities during the acquisition phases and through
tailored terms and conditions. Well-planned and integrated warranties need not cause
serious disruptions of system deployment or support. Table 1 lists the possible risks







The "wrong" characteristic may be selected, thereby focusing
effort incorrectly
Price It is difficult to estimate expected field performance which is a
basic measure for realistic pricing
Operational Factors Field stresses may be difficult to estimate because of many
unforeseen circumstances
Self-Sufficiency Contractor repair, if part warranty, can reduce military self-
sufficiency for wartime critical items
Equipment Design Contractor may design equipment more suitable for meeting
the warranty commitment than for meeting the military
maintenance environment
Transition If required, transition from contractor maintenance to military




Procurement and logistics procedures may have to be
developed to implement the warranty effectively
Table 1. Warranty Risks [From Ref. 32:p.3-18]
Warranties are tools. Their optimal use is determined by their contribution to
production of higher quality weapon systems within appropriate life-cycle costs. The
cost-effectiveness of a potential warranty must be a major determinant of whether to use
a warranty or not. A life-cycle-cost (LCC) basis may be used, comparing LCC with and
without a warranty. Warranty duration should be 10%-25% of the expected life and
generally not less than one calendar year of operation. For any given procurement, there
may be several warranty variants, each with multiple decision variables to consider. A
complete warranty cost-benefit analysis should consider a number of competing








No evidence of failures
Readiness Availability
Consignment of spares
Logistics Flow Pipeline and storage times
Turnaround times
Spare quantities










Contract Adjustment Warranty duration
Turnaround time




Table 2. Warranty Cost Considerations [From Ref. 32 :p. 7-10]
Tailoring of the warranty terms and conditions to match the system, procurement,
and operational conditions is necessary to develop a cost-effective approach. The terms
of any warranty should be developed based on the objectives and circumstances of the
particular acquisition, considering the planned operational, maintenance, and supply
concepts. In determining whether a warranty is appropriate for a specific acquisition, the
acquisition team should consider the following factors: cost, administration and
enforcement, operational limitations, terms and conditions, and remedies. During initial
fielding, the supply system normally is not fully in place and is unable to cover
unforeseen design or manufacturing defects. There might be problems with the system
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that only normal operating use will uncover; testing never finds all the problems
associated with a new system. Tailoring a warranty to be sufficiently robust will assist
the PM in responding to these unexpected problems during fielding. There are numerous
different warranty arrangements and the selection depends on cost, benefit, and
operational environment. [Ref. 32:p. 2-10]
There are three uses of warranties ~ assurance validation, incentivization, and
insurance. Assurance validation, in the strictest sense, ends at the acceptance of the
system with respect to patent defects and after a reasonable period with respect to latent
defects. Incentivization occurs when guarantee provisions define penalties for failure to
achieve target parameters and/or rewards for "overachievement" of such targets.
Insurance is used against the risks of repair or replacement costs. [Ref. 32:p. 3-1]
An assurance warranty is used when the primary intent is to assure that minimum
design, quality, and performance levels are achieved. The Government is not seeking
anything more than the contract specifies, and the warranty concept and terms and
conditions do not provide any incentives for the contractor to do otherwise. A latent-
defects provision in a warranty has the potential to alleviate uncertainties regarding latent
defects by making the conditions clear under which a warranty claim can be made,
regardless of the condition of the product at time of acceptance. An incentive warranty is
used to provide incentives for the contractor to exceed minimum design, quality, or
performance levels. Distinctions between assurance and incentive warranties are not
always clear. Table list various procurement and deployment factors and their




Intent Meet minimum performance levels Exceed minimum performance
levels
Price May be minimal May be significant
Duration Limited- usually 2 yrs or less May be extensive- usually 3 yrs or
more
Administration Generally moderate May be complex
Technology 1) Well within state of the art
Or
2) So severely pushed that a limited
warranty is realistic
Pushes state of the art. Employed to
protect against failures and allows
opportunity for growth
Contractor Limited opportunity to control and
improve performance
Significant opportunity to control
and improve performance
Competition May sustain competitive climate May reduce competitive climate
Table 3. Assurance Vs. Incentive [From Ref. 32:p. 3-5]
Four of the more commonly used incentive warranties are Reliability
Improvement Warranty (RTW), Mean Time Between Failures Guarantee (MTBFG),
Availability Guarantee (AG), and Logistics Support Cost Guarantee (LSCG). Summaries
of these four forms and Spare Parts-Level Warranty are discussed in Table 4 below.
Spare Parts-Level Warranty (SPLW) is a unique adaptation of an availability guarantee
wherein the availability is managed by providing consignment repair parts to meet the
Mean Time Between Removal, Repair, or Replacement rate. This warranty is not a
commonly known or used warranty, but is a type of warranty that could have been used
in the case of the TQG.
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SUMMARY OF FIVE INCENTIVE WARRANTIES
TYPE OBJECTIVE APPROACH REMEDY CONDITIONS
RTW
Achieve Under fixed price, Contractor repairs all Depot repairable
acceptable contractor performs failures. Has option to units. Tolerable to
reliability. depot maintenance at implement no-cost reduce military
Motivate least 2 yrs. engineering change self-sufficiency.
contractor to proposals.
improve.
MTBFG Achieve required Contractor guarantees If guaranteed value is MTBF is
field MTBF. field MTBF. not achieved, appropriate
Measurements are made contractor must parameter. MTBF
and compared. implement solution. is measurable.
AG
Achieve required System availability is If guaranteed value is Availability is
operational measured in the field or not achieved, appropriate
availability. through special tests and contractor must parameter.




Control LSC. Contractor "bids" Contract price Appropriate LSC
model-generated target adjustment. model exists.
LSC. Same model is Correction of Generally, special
used to obtain measured deficiency may be test program
field parameters. required. required to obtain
Values are compared. measured values.
Maintain the Contractor guarantees Spare system or items FFP contracts for
Spare
original system that if the system or or major components equipment or
Parts- with a lowered item exceeds a specified will be provided as items, which are
Mean Time percentage envelope consignment spares. prune mission
Level Between from a guaranteed Adjustments will be essential or
Removal, Repair, MTBR, the contractor made for exceeding a operational safety
or Replacement will provide specified percentage essential.
(MTBR). consignment spares. envelope. Designed for
service organic
maintenance.
Table 4. Summary Of Five Incentive Warranties [After Ref. 32:p. 3-8]
The objective of RTW is to achieve acceptable reliability while providing the
motivation and mechanism for reliability improvement. This is accomplished through a
fixed price contract for the contractor to perform repair for all covered failures during the
warranty period. The price paid for the warranty is based on reasonable costs to repair
covered failure rates when the field failure rate is consistent with that specified or
"expected." It is in the interest of the contractor to produce equipment with an MTBF
58
greater than the original MTBF if the incremental development or production costs to
achieve the target MTBF are less than the reduction in future warranty repair costs. The
contractor, who also repairs all failures, has the opportunity to devote resources to detect
systemic failures as early as possible. If a fix can be developed and implemented in time
to reduce the number of future failures economically, the contractor will be inclined to do
so. [Ref. 32:p. 3-7]
An MTBFG provides a direct means for controlling the operational reliability of
fielded systems. This is accomplished by specifying in the contract the MTBF to be
achieved in the field, a means for measuring the operational MTBF, and actions to be
taken if the measured MTBF is less than the guaranteed value. The MTBFG is best
applied if the weapon system is under contractor maintenance so that the problems can be
identified and remedied expeditiously. The MTBFG, in conjunction with an RIW, can
provide a method for assuring satisfactory or improved reliability performance. [Ref.
32:p. 3-9]
An AG is similar in concept to an MTBFG in that it focuses on a measurable
population characteristic rather than on individual systems failures. In this case, the
characteristic is operational availability, which measures the system readiness rate. [Ref.
32:p. 3-11]
The LSCG is used when the main focus for control is logistics support cost
(LSC). A target logistics support cost (TLSC) is established in the contract, reflecting the
costs to support the guaranteed equipment (i.e. acquisition costs, reliability and
maintainability, and support factors). Appropriate statistics on fielded equipment are
collected, usually through a special test, and the measured logistics support cost (MLSC)
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is calculated. The MLSC is then compared to the TLSC; if the MSLC is greater, a
warranty breach has occurred and specified remedies must be invoked. If the MLSC is
less than the TLSC, a positive incentive such as an award fee may be applied. [Ref. 32:p.
3-12]
Another type of warranty is Spare Parts-Level Warranty. The objective of this
warranty is to maintain the system capability with a lowered Mean Time Between
Removal, Repair, or Replacement (MTBR). In this case the contractor guarantees that if
the system or item exceeds a specified percentage envelope for the guaranteed MTBR,
spare system or items or major components will be provided as consignment spares. If
multiple tests are made over time, appropriate adjustments will be made for exceeding the
specified percentage envelope. [Ref. 32 :p. H-9]
As shown above, warranties can be crafted to do or cover support requirements.
There are some excellent reasons to have extensive warranties as well as some very good
grounds not to use warranties. A detailed cost benefit analysis needs to be conducted to
ensure the Government is receiving good value for what it is actually paying. In the case
of the TQG, as stated in Chapter 2, the PM-MEP used the warranty only for quality
assurance. The existing warranty covered an important aspect, but provided minimal
coverage. If the main objective of the warranty is to reduce the reliance on the supply
system, warranties should be crafted to improve reliability.
Increased reliability decreases the need for spare parts, thereby; there is less need
for the supply system to be responsive. If reliability cannot be influenced, as is often the
case in Technology Integration/NDI systems, then the solution may be to craft a warranty
that includes aspects of LSCG and Spare Parts-Level warranties. The trends revealed in
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Chapter 3 clearly depict the need for some system to bridge the supply gap. A warranty
with some features of LSCG and Spare Parts-Level would have helped Fort Campbell
minimize the downtime that they experienced.
Additionally, the current warranty was meant for a unit that rarely goes to the
field and, then, only for short periods of time. This was not the case for units at Fort
Campbell, which spent at least 30 days in the field at a given time and went to the field
more frequently. In such cases, first fielded units constantly train in the field for a long
time are at risk of degraded readiness. Such units do not have the luxury of time to wait
for the supply system to fill the requisitions or the contractor to fix the design flaws. To
cover both problems, a time-phased warranty which had assurance, LSCG, and Spare
Part-Level features in it would have worked well, using extensive coverage on early-
fielded units and gradually decreasing the scope of the warranty as the fielding
progressed and the supply system matured.
D. CONTRACTOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT
In conjunction with warranties, Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) was reviewed
as a means to supplement the supply system during initial fielding. The logistics strategy
must be compatible with the program acquisition strategy. Unfortunately, logistics
concerns are often deferred for later resolution. Understandably, the Project Manager
with a funding shortfall is more likely to cut the long-term logistics requirements from
the contract than items with immediate impact. [Ref. 33] This gap seems to be a
problem for systems that are developed using commercial and NDI items. When using
commercial or NDI items, it is normally not possible to influence the design to minimize
support requirements.
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Since NDI systems are fielded relatively quickly, establishing the support system
in time to meet the need can be a challenge. Logistics planning time is compressed.
Decisions affecting spares must be made very early in the life cycle of a system. The
DoD Logistics Strategic Plan states that in five years CLS will be applied essentially to
all new weapon systems and major equipment except where military requirements or
"best value analysis" dictate that organic support is more appropriate. [Ref. 34] CLS
should be considered as a support alternative and utilized when determined to be
effective in terms of reducing total ownership cost and improving readiness.
Conducting a support analysis must show that CLS is the optimum among
feasible alternatives, will provide the required support in peacetime and wartime, is the
most cost effective, and is in the government's best interest. A wide selection of contract
types is available, and provides flexibility in acquiring the needed logistics resources.
These contracts vary according to the degree and timing of responsibility and risks
assumed by the contractor for cost and performance and the amount and nature of profit
incentive. Logistics incentives mechanisms in contracts should be designed to address
one or more of the following conditions:
Designs that tend to reduce logistics costs during the operational phase of
the life cycle (increased use of standard components, reduced trouble-
shooting time, etc.); Logistics system accelerated delivery (all elements)
commensurate with accelerated program delivery; and/or R&M [reliability
and maintainability] thresholds exceeded. (Incentives are established for
significant goals that will yield increased combat effectiveness or
decreased ownership costs.) [Ref. 33]
Logistics managers must also ensure that follow-on repair parts are obtained in a
cost-effective manner. Relying on the original prime contractor for follow-on support
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material entails risks in the areas of cost and availability of needed repair parts--
especially during the post production support period. [Ref. 33] The major risk area in
logistics contracting, in terms of impact and the probability of its occurrence, is the
failure to contract for data, materials, and services. Impacts may include degraded
support and readiness, cost growth, and loss of the taxpayers' good will and confidence.
[Ref. 33]
The use of commercial support also has the best potential for allowing item
evolution without affecting the ability to support fielded items. There are four benefits of
Contractor Logistics Support. First, it can reduce the annual appropriated spare parts
requirements, assuming the CLS contract results in a reduction in pipeline spares.
Secondly, it can reduce the DoD infrastructure as the contractor assumes management
and warehousing costs. Third, it can lead to long-term increase in component reliability
at a limited cost to the Government assuming the CLS contract incentives provide profit
motive for reliability growth. Finally, it can assist in the maintenance of the defense
industrial base in times of tight budgets. Life Cycle Contractor Support considerations
must be based on readiness and availability requirements, life cycle costs, support risks,
design maturity, planned useful life, materiel system complexity, available manpower
and personnel, and other acquisition and support issues. Depending on the type and
length of support desired, one constraint is the Federal Acquisition Regulations and
another is the Congressional budget process's restriction on contract length. Currently,
contracts are limited to one year with four successive one-year options. This can pose
problems with meeting the requirement for full and open competition, if the service life
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of a piece of equipment is 30 years and the Government desires CLS for a system's entire
life. [Ref. 33]
Interim Supply Support is the recommended approach for supporting initial
operation of newly fielded weapon systems. Interim Contractor Support (ICS) is a pre-
planned, temporary support alternative for the initial period of operational support to a
system or piece of equipment for which eventual organic support is planned; ICS cannot
exceed three years. [Ref. 35] The Interim Supply Support Process is the recommended
approach for supporting initial operation of newly fielded weapon systems. No spare
parts unique to that weapon system are acquired or managed by the Government until the
design is stable and organic capability is established. This allows the program to stabilize
and actual usage data to accumulate for development of spare requirements. As items are
identified as candidates for transition to a Government inventory control point for
management, they will be catalogued. A transition package of items is procured to
support until replenishment buys begin. [Ref. 35]
In the case of the TQG, it seems that Interim Contractor Support would have been
the best way to ensure the supply support plan covered the transition from initial fielding
to sustainment. As stated earlier, it seems that there was a supply problem with the TQG,
not a maintenance problem. Having a contractor support the system until the design
stabilized and the organic capability was established would have helped this predicament.
Allowing the contractor to collect the usage data so that an accurate support package
could be developed with true data on spares requirements would have been invaluable.
This would have allowed the risk of stocking what was not needed to be shifted to the
contractor, not the Government. The contractor would have been more responsive to
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stocking the right parts since they would have been motivated by profit. Additionally, the
contractor would have provided a faster turnaround time on spares, since they would not
have been not be held to the same constraints that the Government experienced in
contracting for spares.
E. DLA AND PRIME VENDOR SUPPORT
The final area of investigation was the use of Prime Vendors for support of the
supply system. Prime Vendor is an adaptation of industry's best practice of buying and
distributing consumable products. [Ref. 36:p. 2] Prime Vendor support holds potential
for significant savings to reinvest in modernization. It is an innovative way to reduce
overall operation and support costs, improve availability of spare parts, and maintain
weapon system readiness rates. The initiative allows the prime contractor to assume
complete responsibility for its overall performance in the field. It eliminates the need for
Government personnel and facilities to manage and store spare parts. [Ref. 37:p. 4] The
Virtual Prime Vendor Program (VPV) is more commonly known as integrated supply
chain management. A single vendor under a long-term contract anticipates the
customer's support needs for a weapon system or commodity area and has supplies
immediately available on demand. The VPV is responsible for providing total logistical
support across traditional commodity or product lines by using state-of-the-art
commercial business solutions. VPV functions can include forecasting requirements,
purchasing, inventory control, engineering support, technical services, storage, and
distribution functions. The VPV draws on a virtual inventory of its own stock, other
vendor's inventories, DLA corporate level contracts, DLA prime vendors, and depot
stock. The VPV integrates the supply chain, providing tailored logistics support to a
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specific major customer and or weapon system. The VPV also provides for national
defense readiness and emergencies. Some of the benefits of using a VPV include
reduced inventory, both wholesale and retail, faster delivery, direct visibility, access to
commercial assets, reduced customer downtime for items awaiting out-of-stock parts, and
value-added services, such as no hassle warranty on returns and technical support. VPV
operates a process-wide paperless system that eliminates inventory redundancies,
simplifies procedures, provides on-demand supply support, and provides a reduced total
cost method of operation. [Ref. 36:p. 2-3]
The Army is pursuing their own program called Prime Vendor Support (PVS).
PVS is an innovative way to reduce overall Operations and Support (O&S) costs,
improve availability of parts, and maintain weapon system readiness rates. The initiative
would allow the prime contractor of an Army weapon system to assume complete
responsibility for its overall performance in the field. This program would transfer
responsibility for complete wholesale support to a single accountable corporate entity,
which would eliminate the need for Government personnel and facilities to manage and
store parts. [Ref. 37:p. 4]
In evaluating whether to use the prime vendor approach, there are six criteria that
must be considered:
• First, we must ensure that any new approach results in no
degradation of readiness.
• Second, that it works in both peace and war.
• Third, that it meets applicable statutory requirements.
• Fourth, that it truly provides a significant cost savings.
• Fifth, that it guarantees a competitive industrial base and vendor
base will remain for the future.
• Sixth, and perhaps the most important that any new approach is
politically sustainable. [Ref. 37:p. 5]
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Mechanics of a Prime Vendor Program — The activity that awards the requirements
contract for specified supplies to a prime vendor makes its selection on a best value basis.
The activity running the program also establishes Distribution and Pricing Agreements
(DAPA) with various manufacturers/ suppliers on a best value basis. Under a DAPA, the
prime vendor agrees with the suppliers to distribute their products to customers in
accordance with prices set forth in the agreement. DAPA is a non-contractual agreement.
An Indefinite Delivery Type Contract may be used to establish the same terms and
conditions. The prime vendor enters agreements with DAPA holders in order to develop
an inventory of supplies. The prime vendor then owns and manages the inventory. The
activity ninning the program establishes a contractual relationship between the prime
vendor and future customers. [Ref. 37]
The Prime Vendor program is very similar to Contractor Logistics Support. The
difference is that Prime Vendor is a long-term supply solution, initiated by DLA, CLS is
a supply and maintenance solution initiated by the PM. This is a very powerful solution
to the problem of supply support for the TQG. If a company had been responsible for the
management of all parts for a single weapons system with access to Depot and DLA
stocks, it could have been very effective. A Prime Vendor would not have had to deal
with as many bureaucratic layers. The success of this initiative would have rested on a
close partnership between the PM's office and the contractor. Additionally, the contract
would have needed to have been crafted so that the contractor would receive an award for
increased responsiveness as well as increased reliability of parts. Without the additional
incentive, the support would have stayed the same as the existing system.
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F. MOTIVATION
The recurring dilemma appears to be ensuring that the incentives for everyone
from the project manager to the item manager are in line with the overall objective ~
reduce life cycle cost, increase readiness and responsiveness. Until the incentives are
changed, participants may not focus on readiness goals. The project manager
traditionally concentrates on cost, schedule and performance. This is not to say that the
PM-MEP did not care about the above issues; rather there is immense pressure from the
field units as well as Congress to get an item fielded as cheaply and quickly as possible.
Item managers may look at best value contracts that do not properly support the
customer. Contractors try to fulfill what is in their contract, whether or not it satisfies the
needs of the customer in the field.
Fort Campbell would have experienced much better support if there had been
appropriate incentivization of the PM, the item manager, and the contractor. Changing
the Acquisition Program Baseline to include logistic support goals and capabilities as
well as field requirements, changes the elements the PM is graded on and, therefore,
transforms the PM's priorities. Better item manager and contractor support would have
occurred if the PM's priorities had been reestablished. Awards and incentives would
have motivated both suppliers and contractors. The PM would have made sure the
contracts reflected logistics support issues to include supply support and an interim
support package so that Fort Campbell would not have faced the numerous support
challenges.
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G. MULTIPLE YEAR CONTRACTING
Another problem to be addressed is the length of multiple year contracts and their
impact on programs and contractors. PM-MEP addressed this issue in the Master Plan as
follows:
Unlike the Major Defense Acquisition Programs, which often have long-
term relationships with a single major defense contractor, the Tactical
Electric Power program has traditionally been supported by multiple small
businesses (or small large businesses). We [PM-MEP] presently have
OPA contracts with four different contractors, and RDT&E contracts with
three others. Because our "prime" contractors are frequently changing, it
has been difficult (if not impossible) for us to establish long-term
contractor logistics support, configuration management or drawing support
relationships with our contractors. We have concluded that the best way
to encourage a stable production base, improve contractor logistics
support, and transfer more configuration management responsibilities to
industry, is to increase the length of our contracts. Based on the pace of
generator technology improvements and our ability to project our
requirements, we concluded that ten-year contracts were optimal.
By extending future re-buy contracts to ten years, we expect to foster more
beneficial contractor relationships to better serve our Soldier, Sailor,
Airman and Marine users. We also should achieve cost reductions
through lower hardware costs, and through elimination of the additional
solicitation processes— including preparation of drawings/solicitations,
elimination of source selection board costs and limitation of the number of
First Article Tests (FAT) due to fewer procurements. PM-MEP is
therefore planning to extend all future routine procurement contracts for
generators from the current five, to ten-year requirements-type contracts.
[Ref. 2]
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Longer contracts allow for better partnering with industry. Contractors can then
develop relationships with suppliers that work with incentives to improve the reliability
and design of the product. Additionally, longer contracts allow for a better use of
incentive warranties. Extending contracts also is less disruptive the logistics support
system since there are less contractors to work with. Furthermore, lengthening the life of
the contract eliminates redundancies and businesses do not have to repeat the learning
curve upon award of a contract.
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Unfortunately, for Fort Campbell, the PM-MEP did not take sufficient action to
alleviate the supply and readiness problems that plagued the 101 st Airborne Division.
Fort Campbell needed a system that bridged the gap between initial fielding and a mature
supply system to ensure operational readiness. This did not happen. The 101 st Airborne
Division needed an initial fielding package that was tailored to the real problems with the
TQGs. Fort Campbell also needed a more responsive supply system and warranty to
satisfy its requests for spare parts. Furthermore, it needed a responsive mechanism that
would react when readiness was being degraded by the supply system's inability to react.
It is obvious the support systems failed to adequately deal with the TQG.
Having a better warranty, Contractor Logistics Support and Virtual Prime Vendor
support could have alleviated these problems. It would have taken a combination of all
these mechanisms to achieve success. The Project Manager needed to continue to stress
the importance of logistic planning throughout the system's life cycle. Using a time
phased warranty that incorporated aspects of assurance, LSCG, and Spare Parts-Level
would have seen a return on the money invested. Interim Contractor Support would have
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covered risk, while maintaining readiness. Together these mechanisms would have
allowed for adequate support coverage, while minimizing investment in repair parts as
the design stabilized. Using Prime Vendor support after Contractor Logistics Support
would have ensured uninterrupted coverage of the supply system. The use of incentives
with Prime Vendors would have increased their responsiveness to long-term reliability
and readiness of the TQG.
Proper incentivization of the PM, the item manager, and the contractor would
have made the difference at Fort Campbell. Changing the Acquisition Program Baseline
to include logistic support goals and capabilities based on field requirements would have
refocused the PM's priorities. Realigning the PM's priorities would then have been
reflected in better item manager and contractor provided support. The PM would have
had a vested interest in making sure the contracts reflected logistics support issues to
include supply support and an interim support package so that Fort Campbell could have
overcome the numerous support challenges.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The general lesson learned is that the Acquisition Program Baseline needs to be
changed to reflect logistics support elements to ensure Project Mangers focus on
continuous support of a newly fielded system. When using commercial items, non-
developmental items, and technology insertion, the acquisition timeline is compressed
and logistic support of these items suffers since there is less time to test and plan for
spare parts. This has a tremendous effect of the field user. There may be at least a two-
year gap (or more) between when an item is initially fielded and when the existing supply
system becomes able to successfully react. When a chosen logistics strategy fails, it
affects the operational availability of deploying field units in times of conflict and it may
take years to get the unit well again. More assets are needed during the initial planning
stages of these items to identify and produce the support structures needed for the life of
the system. A combination of well written and executed warranties, contractor logistics
support, and prime vendor support will allow for a successful fielding by ensuring the
gap has been bridged between initial fielding and long term sustainment.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Users need to develop a better way of communicating their requirements needed
in the field to the developers. Additionally, developers need to ensure they are thinking
from the perspective of the user when they design systems. Systems engineers need to
ensure they use integrated product teams when developing new systems and that someone
represents the users and field logisticians on the team. Over the past five years,
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acquisition reform has better tied the user to the development process, but the perspective
of the user and support logistician must be continually emphasized during system
development.
The Acquisition Program Baseline needs to be changed to reflect logistics support
planning elements. The PM's priorities need to be changed to ensure he or she is looking
at the key logistical planning steps and the supportability of the system. Logistics
support goals need to include operational availability, mean turnaround time, mean time
to repair, and mean time between failure rates and the metrics to evaluate them.
Interim support planning should include warranties, contractor logistic support
and prime vendor support. Warranties and CLS are solutions to be initiated by the PM
and Prime Vendor is a solution to be initiated by DLA. The contracts need to be written
to reflect the support really needed with awards and incentives for increased reliability
and improvement. It will take a combination of all of these mechanisms to achieve
success and bridge the gap between a newly fielded item and a mature supply system.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
There are many opportunities and different avenues to approach life cycle
logistics support issues. Some possible areas for further research include:
A study of contractual arrangements to cover warranties, contractor logistics
support, and prime vendor to include actual contract wording to cover interim logistics
support.
A study of the decision-making process needed to ensure the correct metrics are
used in the Acquisition Program Baseline to guarantee proper attention and compliance to
logistic support elements.
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APPENDIX A. FAMILY OF TACTICAL QUIET GENERATORS
The following is pictures and information on each member of the family of
Tactical Quiet Generators from 5kW to 60kW to include the Power Plants, which are just
two generators mounted on a trailer.
5KW TQG GENERATOR



















Wet Weight 888 lb. 9111b.
Length 50.4 in. 50.4 in.
l
Width 31.8 in. 31.8 in.
Height 36.2 in. 36.2 in.
i






















































Wet Weight 11821b. 1220 lb.
Length 61.7 in. 61.7 in.
Width 31.8 in. 31.8 in.
Height 36.2 in. 36.2 in.































































Wet Weight 21241b. 22381b.
L
i
Length 69.3 in. 69.3 in.
Width 35.3 in. 35.3 in.
Height 54.1 in. 54.1 in.


























































Length 79.3 in. 79.3 in.
Width 35.3 in. 1 35.3 in.
Height 54.1 in. 54.1 in.
i
Cubic Feet 88 88
Noise at 7
meters













































Wet Weight 4063 lb. 4153 lb.
i
Length 86.3 in. 86.3 in.
Width 35.3 in. 35.3 in.
i
Height 58.2 in. 58.2 in.




























Power Units and Power Plants
Power Unit Description
Power units consist of a single generator (5 to 60kW)























































LIN G42238 G53403 G42170 G78203 G78374 Z00844 G35919 G35851 G17460 G78306
ZLIN Z29764 Z44714 Z29764 Z67139 Z67071 Z00844 Z00776 Z00708 Z44748 Z29832
Weight 2320 lb. 2469 lb. 2457 lb. 4855 lb. 31801b. 4920 lb. 5730 lb. 5700 lb. 68131b. 6720 lb.








































































Power plants consist oftwo generators per
system, generally on a single trailer, but in a




















































LIN TBD TBD P28083 P28151 P42262 P42330 G53778 P42614 P42126 P42194
ZLIN Z13713 Z13645 Z75459 Z75459 Z50264 Z50263 Z00844 Z50263 Z50259 Z50259


































Trk, Cgo Trk, Cgo Trk,
2-1/2 ton 2 1/2 ton Cgo2-l/2
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APPENDIX B. AQUISTION OF COMMERICIAL OFF THE SHELF VS. NON-
DEVELOPMENTAL ITEMS
The following is the Federal Acquisition Regulation's definition of a Commercial
Item or more commonly known as Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) and Non
Developmental Items. It is followed by the decision process a Project Manger must go
through and tradeoffs between cost and time.
FAR DEFINITION SUMMARIZED
(1)
An item offered for sale,
lease or license to the
general public
(2)
An item that evolved





Services procured for the
_
support of (1), (2), (3) & (4~
(6)
Services offered and sold
competively in the ^
commercial market-
place at catalog prices
(3) ^r*
Items that are minor or
standard modifications
of (1 ) & (2)
(4) ^
Any combination of (1),
(2), (3), or (5) customarily
sold to the general public
I(7)
Any of (1) thru (6) that have
been transferred from
another of a contractor's
organizations
(8)
An item sold competitively in





/ (DAny previously developeditem used by federal, state,local, or allied governments
2)N*(2)










































' In preparation for the market investigation establish objectives and thresholds for
cost, schedule, and performance based on the users' operational and readiness
requirements.
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Associated Support Items of Equipment
Authorized Stockage List
Cost As an Independent Variable
Contractor Logistics Support
Continental United States
Commercial Off the Shelf
Central Receiving Point
Defense Automatic Addressing System
























Logistics Support Cost Guarantee
Major Command
Mobile Army Surgical Hospital

















































Measured Logistics Support Cost
Material Release Order
Main Support Battalion
Mean Turn Around Time
Mean Time Between Failures
Mean Time Between Failures Guarantee
Mean Time Between Removal, Repair, or Replacement
Mean Time Between Unscheduled Events
Mean Time To Repair
Non-Developmental Items
New Equipment Training
National Inventory Control Point
Non Mission Capable Maintenance
Non Mission Capable Supply
National Stock Number
Order and Ship








Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services





Readiness Integrated Data Base
Reliability Improvement Warranty
Standard Army Maintenance System
Standard Army Retail Supply System
Supply Support Activity
Supply Support Requests
Special Tools and Test Equipment
Technology Insertion
Target Logistics Support Cost
Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment
Total Package Fielding
Tactical Quiet Generator
Unit Level Logistics System
Virtual Prime Vendor
Work Order Logistics File
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APPENDIX D. ORIGINAL FIELDING PACKAGE, DLA DEMAND HISTORY
AND FT. CAMPBELL DEMAND HISTORY
The following table lists the original fielding package for Fort Campbell by
National Stock Number (NSN), item name, price, unit of issue (UI), quantity needed for
each type of generator, and total quantity per line item, and total price per line item.
Then it lists the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) item manager's demand history for
1998 and 1999 with the total demand in lines and total demand in quantity. It is followed
by whether it is demand supported by Fort Campbell (FTCKY) and if it is contained on
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APPENDIX E. NEW FIELDING PACKAGE TAILORED TO FT. CAMPBELL'S
FIELDING
The following table lists the new fielding package adjusted for the number and
type of generators fielded at Fort Campbell by whether it is a new addition since the old
fielding package, the National Stock Number (NSN), item name, quantity needed for








































2910000995467 FILTER, ELE 25 20 45 2.89 130.05
2910013332309 NOZZLE, FUE 1 3 4 5.80 23.20
2910013556028 INJECTOR, AS 8 8 16 128.55 2056.80
2910013594971 FILTER, ELE 8 8 16 12.76 204.16
2910013606368 FILTER ELE 9 9 14.28 128.52
2910013667293 PUMP, FUEL 5 3 1 2 2 13 53.38 693.94
2910013786025 PUMP, FUEL 5 3 8 66.82 534.56
2920012246246 PARTS KIT 4 4 8 5.70 45.60
2920012246247 PARTS KIT 4 4 8 7.65 61.20
2930013594992 WATER PUMP 4 3 7 262.00 1834.00
Y 2930013681071 RADIATOR 2 2 297.00 594.00
2940000074791 FILTER ELE 8 8 16 2.61 41.76
Y 2940009347989 FILTER, AIR 10 8 18 5.71 102.78
2940011033268 FILTER, AIR 3 3 24.96 74.88
2940013615161 FILTER ELE 25 20 45 2.07 93.15
Y 2940013656535 FILTER, AUX 25 20 9 8 8 70 2.98 208.60
2940013765666 FILTER, FLU 25 20 9 54 28.58 1543.32
2990013667020 MUFFLER, EX 186.47 0.00
2990013701546 MUFFLER, EX 1 1 152.42 152.42
3030010174340 BELT, V 3 3 7.83 23.49
3030012317066 BELT, V 2 2 4 9.15 36.60
3030013758087 BELT, V 7 5 12 12.00 144.00
Y 4130013781130 FILTER ELE 3 3 6 28.60 171.60
Y 5905006435626 RESISTOR VAR 2 1 3 2.40 7.20
Y 5925000893031 CKT BREAK 5 4 1 2 2 14 19.81 277.34
Y 5930013779113 SWITCH, TEMP 1 1 70.37 70.37
Y 5930013786882 SWITCH TEMP 4 3 7 17.90 125.30
Y 5945004583351 RELAY 4 5 2 2 2 15 17.90 268.50
Y 5945013662725 RELAY 1 2 1 4 93.98 375.92
Y 5945013787172 SOLENOID 6 4 10 60.34 603.40
Y 5961001547046 DIODE 1 1 2 256.85 513.70
Y 5961010679493 DIODE 1 1 2 5.82 11.64
Y 6110013630492 REGULATOR 4 3 7 412.06 2884.42
6110013740836 REGULATOR 1 1 2 8.98 17.96
Y 6115013682911 ALTERNATOR 2 1 3 184.21 552.63
6210005839349 LIGHT, INDI 5 4 9 8.13 73.17
6620011283053 TRANSMITTER 4 3 1 8 18.06 144.48
6620012207105 THERMOSTAT 1 1 15.11 15.11
6625000030975 WATTMETER 1 1 1 3 159.64 478.92
6625000048066 METER, ELEC 1 1 1 3 13.12 39.36
6625000815840 AMMETER 1 1 2 15.63 31.26
6625008693144 VOLTMETER 1 1 15.63 15.63
Y 6625010386826 VOLTMETER 4 3 7 56.15 393.05
Y 6625010386829 AMMETER, AC 4 3 7 58.49 409.43
Y 6625010386869 METER, FREQ 4 3 7 44.01 308.07
6685013484793 THERMOSTAT 3 1 1 5 224.85 1124.25
6685013609653 THERMOSTAT 4 3 7 63.42 443.94
Y 6685013696549 INDICATOR 4 3 1 1 1 10 15.14 151.40
6695013687113 TRANSDUCER 4 3 7 35.08 245.56
Total 208 167 47 46 47 515 18480.64
QUANTITIES ON HAND
AT FT. CAMPBELL 226 120 37 40 33
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APPENDIX F. FORSCOM EQUIPMENT HISTORICAL AVAILABILITY
The following table lists the equipment historical availability trends for Forces
Command (FORSCOM) from 1995 to 1998 on the following model generators - PU 797,
PU 798, PU 802, PU 803, MEP 802, MEP 803, and MEP 805.
99
MODEL NMCS NMCM FMC QOH DATE
PU 797 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 QTR 96
0.00 0.00 0.00 2 QTR 96
1.00 1.40 97.60 16 3 QTR 96
1.40 0.10 98.50 41 4 QTR 96
6.80 2.60 90.60 57 1 QTR 97
3.50 3.00 93.50 80 2 QTR 97
1.90 0.70 97.40 90 3 QTR 97
2.50 1.10 96.40 121 4 QTR 97
0.00 0.00 0.00 1 QTR 98
0.00 0.00 0.00 2 QTR 98
0.00 0.00 100.00 3 3 QTR 98
2.80 1.40 95.80 148 4 QTR 98
MODEL NMCS NMCM FMC QOH DATE
PU 798 0.4 0.2 99.40 40 4 QTR 95
1.60 0.50 97.90 41 1 QTR 96
3.10 0.00 96.90 61 2 QTR 96
0.80 0.00 99.20 59 3 QTR 96
0.30 0.10 99.60 103 4 QTR 96
1.60 0.40 98.00 144 1 QTR 97
1.90 0.70 97.40 170 2 QTR 97
2.10 0.50 97.40 218 3 QTR 97
1.40 0.30 98.30 200 4 QTR 97
0.70 0.40 98.90 575 1 QTR 98
0.80 0.60 98.60 525 2 QTR 98
1.40 0.90 97.70 303 3 QTR 98
2.60 1.00 96.20 265 4 QTR 98
MODEL NMCS NMCM FMC QOH DATE
PU802 1.80 0.00 98.20 37 4 QTR 95
3.50 0.10 96.40 91 1 QTR 96
2.60 0.90 96.50 89 2 QTR 96
2.00 1.90 96.10 126 3 QTR 96
2.20 1.70 96.10 154 4 QTR 96
2.10 0.50 97.40 145 1 QTR 97
4.40 0.90 94.70 166 2 QTR 97
1.70 0.50 97.80 255 3 QTR 97
1.20 0.60 98.20 173 4 QTR 97
2.00 2.50 95.50 216 1 QTR 98
2.80 2.20 95.00 204 2 QTR 98
5.30 1.60 93.10 190 3 QTR 98
3.70 3.10 93.20 198 4 QTR 98
100
MODEL NMCS NMCM FMC QOH DATE
PU803 1.90 0.00 98.10 40 4 QTR 95
0.20 0.60 99.20 68 1 QTR 96
2.00 0.30 97.70 69 2 QTR 96
1.00 0.50 98.50 80 3 QTR 96
1.20 0.20 98.60 104 4 QTR 96
1.00 0.10 98.90 101 1 QTR 97
2.50 0.10 97.40 141 2 QTR 97
2.40 0.40 97.20 210 3 QTR 97
2.00 0.70 97.30 130 4 QTR 97
1.20 1.00 97.80 128 1 QTR 98
2.30 1.50 96.20 130 2 QTR 98
2.80 2.40 94.80 133 3 QTR 98
2.40 3.00 94.60 146 4 QTR 98
MODEL NMCS NMCM FMC QOH DATE
MEP802 1.40 0.20 98.40 300 1 QTR 96
2.00 0.40 97.60 398 2 QTR 96
1.80 0.60 97.60 505 3 QTR 96
1.90 0.50 97.60 644 4 QTR 96
2.90 0.80 96.30 685 1 QTR 97
3.20 0.70 96.10 737 2 QTR 97
2.20 0.90 96.90 1125 3 QTR 97
2.00 0.70 97.30 744 4 QTR 97
1.70 1.40 96.90 1004 1 QTR 98
2.40 2.00 95.60 1057 2 QTR 98
2.00 1.60 96.40 1089 3 QTR 98
2.50 1.70 95.80 1137 4 QTR 98
MODEL NMCS NMCM FMC QOH DATE
MEP 803 4 QTR 95
0.00 0.00 100.00 40 1 QTR 96
0.20 0.60 99.20 83 2 QTR 96
2.30 0.00 97.70 141 3 QTR 96
1.20 0.20 98.60 186 4 QTR 96
1.30 0.50 98.20 217 1 QTR 97
2.30 0.50 97.20 261 2 QTR 97
1.70 0.50 97.80 414 3 QTR 97
1.70 0.30 98.00 324 4 QTR 97
0.00 0.00 100.00 13 1 QTR 98
0.00 0.00 100.00 18 2 QTR 98
2.00 0.60 97.40 504 3 QTR 98
2.10 1.30 96.60 541 4 QTR 98
101
MODEL NMCS NMCM FMC QOH DATE
MEP 805 9.80 10.20 80.00 5 4 QTR 95
9.40 3.70 86.90 14 1 QTR 96
3.30 1.10 95.60 23 2 QTR 96
6.80 0.00 93.20 39 3 QTR 96
3.80 0.10 96.10 42 4 QTR 96
0.10 0.00 99.90 39 1 QTR 97
1.00 1.40 97.60 35 2 QTR 97
3.80 0.00 96.20 86 3 QTR 97
0.70 1.90 97.40 43 4 QTR 97
3.10 1.80 95.10 97 1 QTR 98
2.20 0.30 97.50 76 2 QTR 98
2.60 0.40 97.00 77 3 QTR 98
1.80 0.70 97.50 96 4 QTR 98
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MEP 802A 199 6115012747387 551 10910 3.1 19.8 16.7 33 785 23.79 $ 11,688.00
5KW 199 6115012747387 311 14143 3.9 45.4 41.5 72 1779 24.71 $ 45,576.00
1509 199 6115012747387 327 8375 3.5 25.6 22.1 68 2240 32.94 $ 55,306.00
199 6115012747387 257 6525 3.7 25.3 21.6 82 2322 28.32 $119,089.00
PU798 199 6115013199032 183 2998 3.7 16.3 12.6 6 26 4.33 $ 2,120.00
10 KW 199 6115013199032 72 1518 3.2 21 17.8 16 337 21.06 $ 2,990.00
432 199 6115013199032 128 2712 3.8 21.1 17.3 26 537 20.65 $ 13,824.00
199 6115013199032 76 1864 4.4 24.5 20.1 28 637 22.75 $ 49,920.00
PU802 199 6115013172138 109 1868 3.4 17.1 13.7 1 32 32.00 $ 95.00
15KW 199 6115013172138 50 1432 2.5 28.6 26.1 9 231 25.67 $ 1,055.00
307 199 6115013172138 69 1398 3.3 20.2 16.9 15 200 13.33 $ 1,118.00
199 6115013172138 59 2150 4.1 36.4 32.3 27 369 13.67 $ 15,256.00
MEP 805 199 6115012747389 49 1196 3.8 24.4 20.6 7 190 27.14 $ 3,416.00
30KW 199 6115012747389 50 1469 3.2 29.3 26.1 13 277 21.31 $ 2,634.00
212 199 6115012747389 44 1021 3.4 23.2 19.8 15 297 19.80 $ 3,641.00
199 6115012747389 35 1240 4.1 35.4 31.3 19 389 20.47 $ 7,940.00
PU803 199 6115013172136 59 1241 4 21 17 3 47 15.67 $ 501.00
10KW 199 6115013172136 32 2477 5 77.4 72.4 6 140 23.33 $ 4,409.00
210 199 6115013172136 31 441 2.7 14.2 11.5 4 44 11.00 $ 827.00
199 6115013172136 37 1141 3.2 30.8 27.6 20 413 20.65 $ 17,146.00
MJQ-37 199 6115012996035 91 1184 3.2 13 9.8 4 80 20.00 $ 555.00
10KW 199 6115012996035 35 2021 5 57.7 52.7 8 281 35.13 $ 1,245.00
241 199 6115012996035 62 1222 3.9 19.7 15.8 7 148 21.14 $ 4,513.00
199 6115012996035 37 939 5 25.3 20.3 14 246 17.57 $ 10,658.00
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